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 II.-303 
THE CUSTOMER IS ALWAYS RIGHT: 
TRADEMARK LAW AND GENERIC 
WEBSITE NAMES IN U.S. PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE v. BOOKING.COM B.V. 
Abstract: In 2020, in U.S. Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V., the 
Supreme Court clarified that the owner of a website with a descriptive domain 
name could trademark the name, even if it were styled “generic.com,” as long as it 
had acquired secondary meaning to consumers. Justice Breyer, in his dissent, vig-
orously argued that this ruling would limit competition. He claimed that allowing 
Booking.com to trademark its brand name, which contains terms that competitors 
use to describe similar business activities, would essentially be giving it a monopo-
ly. This Comment supports the majority’s decision, as it conforms with the Lanham 
Act. Further, this Comment maintains that existing protections mitigate Justice 
Breyer’s monopolization concerns and argues that the Patent and Trademark Office 
should instill a strict evidentiary requirement for consumer perception. 
INTRODUCTION 
Businesses spend millions annually on marketing to increase product 
recognition and their brand’s reputation, or goodwill.1 Customers use a com-
pany’s brand to differentiate it from its competitors.2 There is a consensus, 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Ivan De Luce, 10 Companies That Spent More Than $1 Billion in Ads So You’d Buy Their 
Products, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/10-biggest-advertising-
spenders-in-the-us-2015-7 [https://perma.cc/5KXK-UWM6] (listing the companies that have spent the 
most in advertising in 2018, a record year for advertising expenditures); Christine Moorman, Market-
ing Budgets Vary by Industry, CMO INSIGHTS & ANALYSIS FROM DELOITTE (Jan. 24, 2017), https://
deloitte.wsj.com/cmo/2017/01/24/who-has-the-biggest-marketing-budgets/ [https://perma.cc/P46U-
RJ5X] (exploring marketing expenditure as a percentage of overall budget and finding that when 
marketing increases profits, companies spend much more of their budget to entice customers to buy 
their products). A company’s goodwill is its reputation with consumers and its brand is the company’s 
physical mark that consumers look for to distinguish it from competitors, a marker of its goodwill. See 
Goodwill, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (describing goodwill as a measure of a compa-
ny’s reputation); U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., TRADEMARK BASICS, https://www.uspto.gov/
trademarks-getting-started/trademark-basics [https://perma.cc/4KKX-P3AT] (Jan. 17, 2021) (defining 
a trademark as synonymous with brand). For example, old and new customers buying Apple’s smart 
phones because of the company’s strong reputation would demonstrate Apple’s goodwill, and the 
apple logo that it puts on its devices would be its brand. See Goodwill, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 
supra (defining goodwill as a company’s reputation). A company’s goodwill is included in its valua-
tion as an asset and includes its reputation and the extent to which customers choose its products or 
services over others. Id. Additionally, because a company’s trademark is a signal of its goodwill, in-
fringement of that trademark is theft. Id. 
 2 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 1. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 
considers a company’s trademark as synonymous with its brand name and defines it as any combina-
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rooted in common law, that businesses deserve to benefit from the good repu-
tation of their brand and that competitors should not overstep by taking ad-
vantage of another’s goodwill.3 It is less clear, however, when protecting a 
brand’s reputation would stifle legitimate competition.4 This issue does not 
arise when entities trademark terms or symbols for their products that are en-
tirely unique but, rather, with marks that are generic or descriptive of a type of 
good or service.5 In such circumstances, trademark status would grant the 
owner of a non-distinctive mark a monopoly over the use of a term that its di-
rect competitors employ to describe their shared business.6 In 2020, in U.S. 
                                                                                                                           
tion of words or symbols that indicate that the company made the trademarked product. Id. For exam-
ple, Apple and Samsung, competing smartphone makers, rely on brand appeal to distinguish them-
selves from each other. See id.; Geoffrey Cain, Samsung Vs. Apple: Inside the Brutal War for 
Smartphone Dominance, FORBES (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesdigitalcovers/
2020/03/13/samsung-vs-apple-inside-the-brutal-war-for-smartphone-dominance/#43a8a9ed4142 
[https://perma.cc/R7YT-X39X] (detailing how Samsung launched an innovative campaign in the 
United States to compete with Apple for brand domination). 
 3 See H.R. REP. NO. 79-219, at 2 (1945) (explaining the policy basis for the Lanham Act, the 
statute that controls trademark registration). Businesses have long marked their products. J. THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5:1 (5th ed. 2020). Indeed, 
merchants from more than 4,000 years ago used to mark their goods so that buyers could identify the 
product’s origin. David D. Mouery, Comment, Trademark Law and the Bottom Line—Coke Is It!, 2 
BARRY L. REV. 107, 111 (2001). The earliest recorded common law trademark case is Sykes v. Sykes, 
decided in 1824. Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1853 (2007). In Sykes, the English court held that the defendants had infringed 
upon the plaintiff’s rights by using its mark to disguise the defendants’ products as the plaintiff’s. Id. 
See generally Sykes v. Sykes (1824) 3 B&C 541, 107 Eng. Rep. 834 (LJKBOS) (holding that defend-
ant’s use of “Sykes Patent” on products that imitated plaintiff’s caused consumer confusion, decreased 
plaintiff’s sales, and was thus a violation of plaintiff’s rights). 
 4 See U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2310 (2020) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that allowing the registration of a generic term would give the business a monop-
oly over other similar services). This issue may arise in two cases; first, where a company tries to 
trademark the name of a generic class of goods, thus gaining control over the use of that mark to de-
scribe an entire class of product. See id. at 2315 (providing “Wine” as an example of an unacceptable 
trademark because it is synonymous with the product itself and thus not distinguishing for customers, 
and it could prevent competitors from using “Wine” to describe their own products). Second, the issue 
arises when a company tries to infringe on another’s trademark and take advantage of its reputation to 
gain consumers. See Gap, Inc. v. G.A.P. Adventures, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 9614, 2011 WL 2946384, at 
*18 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that Gap, the retailer, was entitled to relief against G.A.P. Adventures, a 
tour operator, because of the risk of consumer confusion). 
 5 See Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2303 (explaining that unique marks allow consumers to 
readily identify the brand because they are distinctive, whereas generic or descriptive marks just indi-
cate the type of good or service and do nothing to distinguish the business). 
 6 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (describing how a mark must be distinct and used to distinguish the prod-
uct from competitors). In U.S. Patent & Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V., Justice Breyer’s con-
cern in his dissent was that allowing Booking.com to trademark its company name would allow them 
to bring infringement lawsuits against companies with “booking” in their name, thereby monopolizing 
the booking industry and preventing competitors from entering the field. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 
at 2315 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (raising the concern of giving Booking.com too much control over the 
booking industry due to the generic term’s expansiveness); see also H.R. REP. NO. 79-219, at 2 (as-
serting that trademark registration is not intended to give the trademark-owner a monopoly). 
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Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V., a majority of the Supreme 
Court held that the primary factor in determining trademark eligibility for a 
descriptive mark is whether the brand has acquired secondary meaning to con-
sumers.7 In his dissent, Justice Breyer derided the majority for stifling compe-
tition by allowing the registration of essentially generic marks.8 He believed 
that doing so would edge out competitors who wanted to allude to their shared 
type of business in their brand name.9 
This Comment argues that the Court’s decision in Booking.com was in 
line with federal trademark policy and will not lead to monopolies because of 
various safeguards already in place.10 Part I discusses federal trademark law in 
the United States, including its purpose and mechanics, as well as the proce-
dural history of Booking.com.11 Part II surveys the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Booking.com.12 Finally, Part III supports the majority’s rationale and argues 
that although the decision is in accordance with federal trademark policy, the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) should require companies to 
present satisfactory evidence to demonstrate that a descriptive mark has ac-
quired sufficient secondary meaning among consumers.13 
I. FEDERAL TRADEMARK LAW 
Federal law protects a company’s brand through the Lanham Act.14 The 
Lanham Act provides both a means to register a trademark and also avenues 
for relief from trademark infringement.15 A trademark is a term or image that 
                                                                                                                           
 7 See Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2307 (majority opinion) (stating that consumer perception 
determined whether a court would consider a mark styled “generic.com” generic or descriptive). A 
seemingly-descriptive trademark, one that is not necessarily distinctive in and of itself, may obtain 
secondary meaning to consumers when consumers recognize that the trademark indicates a specific 
product or brand. Id. at 2302. 
 8 Id. at 2315 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For example, a generic mark may be something indicative of 
a general category of goods or services, like “wine,” but a more unique mark may have no correlation 
to the good or service, like “Kodak.” See id. at 2309–10 (providing “wine” as an example of a generic 
mark that could not be trademarked and “Kodak” as a unique mark that facilitates customers’ identifi-
cation of the product because of its distinctiveness). 
 9 Id. at 2315. 
 10 See infra notes 96–121 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 14–72 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 73–95 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 96–121 and accompanying text. 
 14 See 15 U.S.C § 1051 (describing how brands can apply to register their trademark through the 
PTO); Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2302 (stating that the Lanham Act is the principal protection 
for trademarks in the United States). 
 15 Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2302; see 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (discussing the application process 
for registering a trade or service mark); id. § 1125 (describing the rights of a mark-owner from anoth-
er’s misuse of their mark). The application should include information about the applicant and their 
past usage of the mark, as well as contain a statement that the applicant is the mark’s owner, the own-
er uses the mark in commerce, and the mark does not infringe upon another mark. Id. § 1051. Once 
the PTO registers the trademark, the mark-owner may initiate a lawsuit for injunctive relief and dam-
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differentiates a brand from its competitors.16 For example, “Diet Coke” is a 
registered trademark of The Coca-Cola Company.17 When consumers buy a “Di-
et Coke” they know that they are buying a Coca-Cola product, not an imita-
tion.18 Section A of this Part explores the policy behind trademark protection.19 
Section B discusses current federal trademark law.20 Section C delves into the 
background of U.S. Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V.21 
A. The Purpose of Trademark Protection 
Congress passed the Lanham Act in 1946 to consolidate and clarify previ-
ous federal trademark laws.22 Trademark laws have two goals: (1) to protect 
consumers from purchasing deceptively marketed goods and services, and (2) to 
protect an entity’s ownership of a trademark and its associated value.23 In es-
sence, trademark registration acknowledges and protects the worth of the brand’s 
goodwill.24 Trademark registration guards against unfair competition by ensur-
ing that consumers are not misled into purchasing unintended products.25 The 
House Report on the Lanham Act addressed concerns over monopolies, includ-
ing arguing that the concerns were irrelevant because trademarks assist fair 
competition by allowing consumers to purchase the product that they deem is 
best, without concern of fraud, by encouraging companies to compete for market 
share.26 The Act also ensures that trademark-owners profit as a result of their 
                                                                                                                           
ages against another who uses their mark in a false or misleading way, causing consumer confusion. 
Id. § 1025. 
 16 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 1 (providing information to those wishing to regis-
ter a mark, including information on what is eligible to be trademarked). 
 17 DIET COKE, Registration No. 3,820,750. 
 18 See H.R. REP. NO. 79-219, at 2 (1945) (explaining that federal law protects trademarks to en-
sure that customers get the product they want); John Dwight Ingram, The Genericide of Trademarks, 2 
BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 154, 161 (2004) (remarking that Coca-Cola is known for aggressively pro-
tecting its trademark against infringement). 
 19 See infra notes 22–29 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 30–54 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 55–72 and accompanying text. 
 22 See H.R. REP. NO. 79-219, at 3 (explaining that prior to the Lanham Act, the prevailing federal 
trademark law had been frequently amended and supplemented by other legislation, including through 
provisions in tariff statutes, making it difficult to find and interpret). Additionally, Congress noted that 
previously it had considered trademark law to be a state issue but that, due to the cross-border nature 
of trade, federal trademark regulation was necessary. See id. at 4 (stating that trade is no longer local, 
but national, and interstate commerce is the proper domain of federal law). 
 23 See id. at 4 (describing the “twofold” nature of the Lanham Act: to protect consumers from 
companies deceiving them into buying an unintended product and to safeguard a company’s goodwill 
or reputation in their mark).  
 24 See id. (explaining that when a business has spent resources to promote itself, it should be able 
to benefit from those expenditures and not be at risk of theft or fraud). 
 25 Id. 
 26 See id. at 3 (describing how trademarks give consumers confidence in their choices and en-
courage producers to invest in good quality products). The premise is that when consumers can distin-
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brand’s reputation.27 In this way, trademarks encourage competition and better 
quality products, and they discourage monopolies and efforts to mislead con-
sumers.28 Although Congress has removed or modified certain aspects of the 
Lanham Act, recent Supreme Court decisions have upheld the Act’s stated pur-
pose.29 
B. An Overview of Federal Trademark Law 
The Lanham Act governs the process for registering a trademark and pro-
vides relief in the case of trademark infringement.30 To get trademark protec-
                                                                                                                           
guish among brands they will choose a product that balances quality and cost and that companies will 
accordingly compete to make these products, creating an efficient marketplace. See id. (arguing that 
trademarks are “the essence of competition” in that they allow consumers to choose among competing 
products and thus encourage companies to compete with each other, while protecting the company’s 
brand and reputation from fraud). 
 27 See id. (discussing the policy for preventing expropriation of a business’s goodwill). In 1942, 
in Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Manufacturing Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., a Supreme Court case that the 
Lanham Act Committee Report cited, Justice Frankfurter upheld Mishawaka’s trademark infringe-
ment action. 316 U.S. 203, 208 (1942). In Mishawaka, the defendant had sold lesser-quality shoes that 
incorporated a design element that looked like Mishawaka’s trademark. Id. at 203–04. Mishawaka had 
spent considerable effort and funds to promote its product to the public. Id. The Supreme Court found 
that although there was no evidence that consumers were misled, there was a possibility that some 
may have unintentionally bought the competitor’s product, thinking it was Mishawaka’s. Id. at 204. 
The Court held that this would be damaging to Mishawaka’s brand and thus constituted actionable 
trademark infringement. Id. at 208. Dissenting, Justice Black highlighted that there was no indication 
to support the contention that the defendant purposely misled consumers or that the Mishawaka brand 
was at all affected. Id. at 208–09 (Black, J., dissenting). Without that evidence, Justice Black saw no 
basis for trademark infringement or relief and, indeed, speculated that this would result in Mishawaka 
receiving an undeserved boon by eliminating its competition. Id. at 209. 
 28 See H.R. REP. NO. 79-219, at 3 (arguing that trademarks facilitate superior products by allow-
ing customers to distinguish between brands and choose what they prefer). 
 29 See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1752 (2017) (explaining that trademarks bolster the 
economy by encouraging competition and ensuring that the trademark-owner gets the fruits of his 
goodwill for his higher quality products); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 781–82 
(1992) (reiterating the Lanham Act’s goal to safeguard valid business efforts and consumer expecta-
tions); Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 190 (1985) (reiterating that Con-
gress intended the Lanham Act to “secure” the entity’s goodwill, which is developed from the entity’s 
business and reputation). Recent Supreme Court decisions, for example, have modified the Lanham 
Act and held that its prohibitions against “immoral” trademarks and marks that denigrate any individ-
ual are invalid under the First Amendment. See Iancu v. Brunett, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019) (af-
firming that the immoral trademark clause in the Lanham Act is invalid under the First Amendment); 
Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1765 (holding that the disparagement clause infringes upon the Constitution’s free 
speech clause); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (a)–(b) (declaring ineligible a trademark that included “im-
moral or scandalous” subject-matter, implied a false association between the product and an individual 
or place, denigrated an individual, or featured the insignia of any country). 
 30 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1125; U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298, 
2302 (2020). There are other means of intellectual property protection, namely patents and copyrights. 
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., TRADEMARK PROCESS, https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-getting-
started/trademark-process#step1 [https://perma.cc/WF47-AP52] (Feb. 2, 2021). Patents secure inven-
tions, copyrights safeguard artistic works, and trademarks protect brand names and symbols associated 
with goods and services. Id. For example, if someone invented a new form of blender, they could patent 
II.-308 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:E. Supp. 
tion, an entity must register its mark with the PTO.31 Although the process of 
getting a trademark is straightforward, what can be trademarked is more com-
plicated.32 The Act allows an entity to register its trademark if it meets two 
requirements: (1) it is actively used in commerce, and (2) it is distinctive and 
identifies the brand.33 
Prior to applying, the PTO encourages applicants to consider the strength 
of their mark to ensure it will pass the distinctiveness requirement.34 In classi-
fying strength, the PTO categorizes marks with respect to the associated prod-
                                                                                                                           
the invention, trademark the blender logo, and copyright the radio jingle for the blender. See id. (provid-
ing a similar example for a fictitious invented vacuum cleaner). 
 31 U.S. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 30. First, an entity must submit an application to the 
PTO that describes the mark completely, identifies the relevant goods and services associated with it, and 
ensures that there are no comparable trademarks in use for related goods or services. Id. The purpose of 
this phase is to ward against potential infringement on another trademark. See id. (discussing the search 
requirement and providing information for applicants on how to run a successful search on their 
mark). Next, a PTO examining attorney will review the application. Id. The PTO will then either reject 
the application with an explanation and allow a six month window to re-apply, or it will approve the 
application. Id. If the PTO approves the application, it will publish the mark in an “Official Gazette,” 
which gives other parties thirty days to oppose the registration. Id. If there is no conflict within the time 
period, the PTO will grant the trademark, and the trademark-owner simply has to maintain the mark by 
submitting periodic documents. Id. 
 32 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1052 (outlining requirements for trademark applicants, including that 
the owner use the mark in commerce, the mark does not infringe upon another mark, and it is not just 
descriptive of the product but is distinctive); Jon J. Lee, Double Standards: An Empirical Study of 
Patent and Trademark Discipline, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1627–28 (2020) (stating two common rea-
sons for trademark denial: likelihood of consumer confusion and a lack of distinctiveness). Recogniz-
ing that this standard may be vague, the PTO publishes accessible guidance for applicants to use while 
considering whether their mark meets the criteria for trademark status. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., 
Basic Facts: Selecting a Mark, YOUTUBE (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
z4jmtzR4_NU&feature=emb_title [https://perma.cc/E2AY-Z596] (teaching applicants how to consid-
er the strength of their mark). 
 33 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1052. Applicants can satisfy the first requirement if they simply have a bona 
fide, or genuine, future intent to use the mark in commerce. See id. § 1051 (a)–(b) (discussing the appli-
cation process for a trademark). The PTO stresses the second requirement, that the mark be distinctive 
and indicative of the product’s source, in proceedings so as to avoid consumer confusion. See id. § 1052 
(d)–(e) (stating that a mark cannot infringe upon an existing mark or solely be descriptive of a prod-
uct); U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., supra note 32 (describing the requirements to potential applicants 
so applicants can determine whether their mark is eligible for trademark registration). Additionally, 
the Lanham Act forbids registration for trademarks that use “immoral, deceptive, or scandalous mat-
ter,” denigrate any individual, alive or dead, suggest a false origin for the product, or use any insignia 
of the United States or a United States President. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)–(b). The prohibitions on im-
moral or scandalous marks and on marks that denigrate individuals, however, have been struck down 
by the Supreme Court as violating the First Amendment. See Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2297 (holding that 
the immoral or scandalous trademark bar infringed on the First Amendment); Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 
1765 (stating that the disparagement ban violates the free speech protections of the Constitution). 
 34 U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., supra note 32. The PTO produces material on its website that 
applicants may look at to gauge whether their mark meets the eligibility requirements for trademark 
registration. See id. (outlining the criteria a mark must meet in order to be eligible for trademark regis-
tration). 
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uct as follows: generic, descriptive, suggestive, and fanciful or arbitrary.35 A 
generic mark includes a term that indicates the type of good or service an enti-
ty sells.36 An entity cannot trademark these terms because doing so would 
grant them a monopoly over a term that describes an entire class of goods.37 
Descriptive marks describe the goods or services that the owner offers.38 De-
scriptive marks are generally invalid because they present information, rather 
than indicate a specific business.39 They may be accepted, however, if the enti-
ty can present evidence, commonly through surveys, showing that the term has 
acquired sufficient standing with consumers, or secondary meaning, that it is 
now associated with the business specifically.40 Suggestive, fanciful, and arbi-
trary marks are stronger than descriptive marks, and it is more likely that the 
PTO will accept them for trademark registration.41 Suggestive marks indicate 
aspects of the product, fanciful marks consist of invented terms, and arbitrary 
marks contain terms with an accepted definition that has no connection to the 
                                                                                                                           
 35 Id.; see Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (describing the four 
categories of trademark distinctiveness). In U.S. Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V., 
Justice Ginsburg offered the following examples: “wine” as a generic term, “Park ‘N Fly” as a de-
scriptive mark, “Tide” as a suggestive mark, “Camel” as an arbitrary mark, and “Kodak” as a fanciful 
mark. 140 S. Ct. at 2302–03. 
 36 U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., supra note 32; see 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (e)–(f) (prohibiting trademark 
status for a mark that is merely descriptive of the goods or services offered without being distinctive). 
A candle brand called “Candle” would be an example of a generic mark. See Ingram, supra note 18, at 
156 (explaining that “ivory” is an example of an ineligible descriptive trademark for products made 
from tusks but is acceptable for soap products). 
 37 See H.R. REP. NO. 79-219, at 3 (1945) (stating that the Lanham Act intends to stimulate com-
petition and thus discourage monopolies). Furthermore, generic trademarks could cause consumer con-
fusion because they do not clearly identify the product’s producer. See id. at 2 (clarifying that Congress 
intended the Act to safeguard the public’s expectation that they are getting the specific product they 
want from the producer they intend, as its trademark evidences); U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., supra 
note 32 (emphasizing the distinctiveness of a mark to applicants to satisfy trademark requirements). 
 38 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (explaining federal trademark law regarding descriptive marks); U.S. 
Pat. & Trademark Off., supra note 32. “Tastykake” is an example of a descriptive mark for a pastry. 
See Ingram, supra note 18, at 155 (defining descriptive marks and providing “Tide” laundry detergent 
as an example). 
 39 U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., supra note 32. 
 40 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f); U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., supra note 32; see MCCARTHY, supra note 3, 
§ 12:16 (detailing how the Teflon survey has become the standard test for consumer perception); infra 
notes 67–68 and accompanying text (outlining the Teflon survey method and why the PTO disfavors 
it). The secondary meaning standard allows descriptive marks to gain federal trademark protection if 
they have become distinctive of the products. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f). The Supreme Court clarified the 
secondary meaning standard in 2000 in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., where a clothing 
manufacturer sued Walmart for selling alleged reproductions. 529 U.S. 205, 205, 216 (2000). The 
Court found that a product’s design is not inherently distinctive but that the mark-owner may receive 
trademark protection if it shows that the mark has acquired secondary meaning among consumers and 
that consumers recognize the mark as distinctive of the brand. Id. at 205–06. 
 41 U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., supra note 32. 
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product.42 These marks are the strongest because they are unusual and unrelat-
ed to the product at issue, which makes the brand distinctive.43 Yet, even the 
strongest terms may become generic over time and, thus, the brand may lose 
its trademark registration.44 
Case law has also guided PTO decisions.45 In Goodyear’s Rubber Mfg. 
Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., decided in 1888, the Supreme Court held that 
simply adding “Company” to an already descriptive term did not make it 
trademarkable because “Company” merely indicates an organization.46 Anoth-
er important Supreme Court case was in 1938, in Kellogg Co v. National Bis-
cuit Co., where the Court ruled that Kellogg could continue to produce shred-
ded wheat cereal in the same shape that National Biscuit had patented.47 The 
                                                                                                                           
 42 Id.; see Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9, 10 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(discussing the origin of the “suggestive” category as a middle ground between fanciful and generic 
and highlighting that marks may shift between categories depending on usage and differing meaning). 
“Playboy” Magazine is an example of a suggestive mark. See Ingram, supra note 18, at 155 (defining 
the suggestive term category and providing “Playboy” and “Tide” as examples of marks suggestive of 
particular products, an erotic magazine and laundry detergent). “Penguin” Publishers is an example of 
an arbitrary mark, and “Google” is an example of a fanciful mark. See id. (describing the categories 
and providing examples such as “Kodak” film for a fanciful mark and “Camel” cigarettes for an arbi-
trary mark). 
 43 U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., supra note 32. 
 44 See King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1963) (af-
firming the district court’s holding that “Thermos,” previously trademarked, had become generic 
through extensive, long-term use and therefore no longer had trademark protection); U.S. Pat. & Trade-
mark Off., supra note 32; see Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conun-
drum, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1843 (2007) (citing Allocs for Dummies Inspires IDG Ire, LUMEN 
DATABASE (Mar. 15, 2000), http://www.chillingeffects.org/trademark/notice.cgi?NoticeID=149 [https://
perma.cc/9VDA-U52Q]) (discussing trademark dilution and “genericide” of brands with fanciful 
trademark names, such as Kleenex and Xerox, brand names that became synonymous with the product 
itself). 
 45 See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 174 (1995) (stating that a color 
could be trademarked if it had acquired secondary meaning to consumers); Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Bis-
cuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 111, 122–23 (1938) (holding that Kellogg did not infringe upon National Bis-
cuit’s trademark even though it shared in the company’s acquired goodwill, because the cereal’s name 
was merely descriptive and its shape was functional); Goodyear’s Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rub-
ber Co., 128 U.S. 598, 603 (1888) (forbidding the trademarking of a descriptive term followed by a 
“Company” designation because the designation added no distinguishing meaning). 
 46 Goodyear, 128 U.S. at 603. At the time, “Goodyear Rubber” was a well-known term used to 
describe a type of rubber that Charles Goodyear patented in 1849. Id. at 600, 602. In this case, Goodyear 
Rubber Company sued Goodyear Rubber Manufacturing to prevent them from using “Goodyear” in their 
name, arguing that the defendant was doing so to steal the plaintiff’s business and goodwill. Id. at 600–
01. The defendant stated that it had been using the name for years following its licensing of Goodyear 
patents in 1849. Id. at 600. The Supreme Court affirmed that if anyone could trademark “Goodyear,” the 
defendants would have a right to the mark due to their lengthy use, but stated that the term being descrip-
tive of a means of production made it ineligible for trademark registration. Id. at 602. 
 47 Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 123. National Biscuit sued to prevent Kellogg from making cereal, alleg-
ing unfair competition because Kellogg was also calling its cereal “shredded wheat” and was using the 
same pillow shape for its cereal as National Biscuit. Id. at 111. Specifically, National Biscuit was not 
claiming a right to the cereal itself but, rather, to its name and shape. Id. at 116. In turn, Kellogg ar-
gued that it was engaging in honest competition. Id. 
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Court ruled that this was not trademark infringement because the patent had 
expired, the name “Shredded Wheat” was descriptive, and the shape of the ce-
real was necessary for the product.48 Finally, in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson 
Products Co., decided in 1995, the Supreme Court allowed Qualitex to trade-
mark the color of its dry-cleaning pads.49 Even though the Court found that a 
color was not inherently distinctive, it held that in this case it had acquired a 
special significance to Qualitex consumers, who would seek out the color as a 
symbol of the brand.50 
In cases of alleged trademark infringement, the mark-owner may sue for 
injunctive relief.51 The mark-owner may also sue to recover the competitor’s 
profits at the owner’s expense, damages, and litigation costs.52 The competitor 
may invoke the fair use defense, which exculpates it if it has acted fairly and in 
good faith.53 Importantly, the mark-owner has the burden to overcome the de-
fense and may do so by showing likelihood of confusion.54 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Id. at 113, 116−17, 122. Additionally, the Court held that although Kellogg likely benefited from 
National Biscuit’s goodwill by using the pillow shape, Kellogg had its own company logo on the product 
in a manner sufficient to avoid consumer confusion and prevent unfair competition. Id. at 122. 
 49 Qualitex, 514 U.S at 174. Qualitex manufactures dry cleaning press pads, a product that dry 
cleaners use at the end of the process to press clothes and give them a finished look. See Sun Glow Press 
Pads, QUALITEX CO., http://www.qualitexco.com/http/pads.html [https://perma.cc/9UQW-XBSH] (ad-
vertising that award-winning dry cleaning shops use the Sun Glow Press Pads and stating that the 
green-gold color is a registered trademark). 
 50 Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 171, 174. In Qualitex, both companies sold dry-cleaning pads but the 
Court found that Qualitex alone had cultivated its reputation and goodwill through the product’s asso-
ciation with its color. Id. at 159. The Court held that whether an owner could trademark a product’s 
color as a descriptive mark was not a function merely of the color’s distinctiveness, but whether the 
color had acquired secondary meaning through use. Id. at 163; see supra note 40 and accompanying 
text (describing the secondary meaning standard); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 
Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 206, 216 (2000) (holding that a court may find that a product design is distinctive 
by showing that the secondary meaning of its design caused consumers to seek out the product). 
 51 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (specifying the right to protection from mark infringement); id. § 1116 (de-
tailing the means by which a mark-owner may receive an injunction). A court-ordered injunction 
would prevent the competitor from continuing to infringe by banning their use of the particular mark. 
See id. § 1116 (explaining that equity should guide courts in granting an injunction against a competi-
tor). The Lanham Act distinguishes innocent and culpable infringement by specifying that the mark-
owner may only recover damages when the infringement was knowingly intended to cause consumer 
confusion. Id. § 1114(1). 
 52 Id. § 1117(a)–(d) (outlining recovery for mark infringement, including that a mark-owner may 
recover damages for lost profits and attorney fees, treble damages for intentional misuse of the mark, 
and statutory damages for violations of the Lanham Act). 
 53 Id. § 1115(b)(4) (explaining the fair use defensethat the alleged infringer used the mark at 
issue in good faith and fairly to represent their goods and services or their origin). Under 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1114, a mark-owner has the right to prevent infringement but must provide proof that the use of the 
mark was likely to cause consumer confusion. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, 
Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 117 (2004). In turn, the alleged infringer may assert the fair use defense to rebut 
any allegation under 15 U.S.C. § 1115. Id. at 118. 
 54 KP Permanent, 543 U.S. at 118, 124 (finding that the defendant need not prove fair use after 
asserting it as a defense and that the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show consumer confusion). In KP 
Permanent, Lasting Impression, a beauty company, sued KP Permanent Make-Up over the use of the 
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C. Factual and Procedural Background of U.S. Patent  
and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V. 
Booking.com was founded in 1996 and has become one of the world’s 
largest online travel companies.55 The name “Booking.com” is both the com-
pany’s name and domain name.56 Booking.com applied for trademark registra-
tion in 2011 but the PTO’s examining attorney rejected the application.57 
Booking.com appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), the 
PTO’s appeal board, in 2016, but TTAB also rejected the company’s trademark 
application.58 TTAB determined that “Booking.com” was ineligible because it 
was generic, and, even if it were descriptive, evidence did not indicate that it 
had secondary meaning to consumers.59 TTAB classified “Booking.com” as 
generic because it referred to a type of service, making bookings, but dis-
claimed that it could classify the term as descriptive because it described the 
company’s product, a booking service.60 If it were descriptive, TTAB found 
that evidence indicated that the average consumer understood “Booking.com” 
to refer to a class of services, not a specific brand, and thus it was still ineligi-
ble.61 Booking.com argued that it was within the policy of the Lanham Act to 
                                                                                                                           
term “micro color,” which KP had used since 1990 and Lasting had trademarked in 1992. Id. at 111. 
Although Lasting argued that KP had infringed upon its mark, KP asserted the fair use defensethat 
it had been acting fairly and in good faith in using the term “micro color” to describe its products and 
that it had been using the term from before Lasting received a trademark. Id. In KP Permanent, the 
Supreme Court remanded the case after holding that Lasting had the burden to show consumer confu-
sion, but it also noted that some degree of consumer confusion will be tolerated for a descriptive 
trademark because otherwise the company may gain a monopoly over a term that competitors use to 
describe a shared good or service. Id. at 122, 124. Likelihood of confusion was shown in 1942, in 
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Manufacturing v. S.S. Kresge Co., when the defendant’s shoe con-
tained a similar red plug in its heel and the Supreme Court agreed that there was a “reasonable likeli-
hood” that it deceived some consumers, even though the plaintiffs offered no proof. 316 U.S. 203, 204 
(1942). 
 55 About Booking.com, BOOKING.COM, https://www.booking.com/content/about.html [https://
perma.cc/9NYY-HY7N]. Booking.com connects businesses with travelers and functions as a one-stop-
shop for customers to book flights, hotels, rental cars, and even activities. Id. 
 56 See id. (describing the business of Booking.com at the domain name, booking.com). 
 57 In re Booking.com B.V., 2016 WL 1045674, at *1, *19 n.1 (T.T.A.B. 2016), rev’d and re-
manded sub nom. Booking.com B.V. v. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d 891 (E.D. Va. 2017), aff’d sub nom. 
Booking.com B.V. v. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., 915 F.3d 171, 181 (4th Cir. 2019), vacated, 140 
S. Ct. 2298 (2020). 
 58 Id. at *1, *15–16. Claiming that its name had become distinct and recognizable to consumers due 
to its advertising and strong reputation, Booking.com applied to register four trademarks, each with the 
same term, styled differently. Id. at *2. 
 59 In re Booking.com B.V., 2016 WL 1045674, at *1, 15–16. 
 60 See id. (explaining that a consumer may understand “Booking.com” to mean a generic type of 
services offered by many providers including Booking.com, Expedia.com, and Kayak.com, but that it 
is also descriptive because the name describes the services the company offers). 
 61 See id. at *11 (holding that the J.D. Power survey data showed brand success, not consumers 
understanding the company to be a specific brand). In its appeal before the Trademark Trial and Ap-
peal Board (TTAB), Booking.com presented survey data from J.D. Power & Associates. Id. at *7. The 
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allow a trademark in a case where a company has put a great deal of effort into 
cultivating reputation and goodwill.62 TTAB disagreed, finding that trademark-
ing a generic term creates a monopoly against the express purpose of the Act.63 
After TTAB rejected Booking.com in favor of the PTO’s position, the com-
pany appealed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia in 2017.64 The PTO expanded its argument, claiming that a “.com” desig-
nation was akin to the “Company” designation in Goodyear.65 It argued that the 
addition of the “.com” marker was in itself generic and, thus, did not modify the 
generic nature of “booking.”66 Ultimately, the district court reversed TTAB’s 
decision due to new survey evidence that Booking.com submitted, which 
demonstrated that the site had acquired secondary meaning to consumers.67 The 
                                                                                                                           
survey asked about “pricing; information provided; booking options; the online ‘store’; ease of book-
ing; sales and promotions; and customer service.” Id. at *11. TTAB held that this survey was not as 
demonstrative as a Teflon survey, the standard test for consumer perception, and indeed showed suc-
cess and satisfaction, not perception. Id. 
 62 Id. at *14. 
 63 Id. To the PTO, this would halt competition, as any other company that used the term “Book-
ing.com” may be infringing upon the mark. See id. (rationalizing that allowing a trademark for a generic 
term, one that describes a category of goods, would provide a monopoly because a competitor would not 
be able to describe their goods without infringing upon another’s mark). During oral arguments before 
the Supreme Court, the Government argued that the trademark would give Booking.com a monopoly 
and gave the examples of “ebooking.com” and “hotelbooking.com” as brand names that Booking.com 
would be able to suppress. Oral Argument at 15:07, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. v. Booking.com B.V., 
140 S. Ct. 2298 (2020) (No. 19-46), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2019/19-46 [https://perma.cc/6YR9-
F6RQ]. 
 64 Booking.com B.V. v. Matal. 278 F. Supp. 3d 891, 895 (E.D. Va. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Book-
ing.com B.V. v. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., 915 F.3d 171, 181 (4th Cir. 2019), vacated, 140 S. Ct. 
2298 (2020). 
 65 Id. at 910. 
 66 Id.; Oral Argument, supra note 63, at 01:28. 
 67 Booking.com B.V., 278 F. Supp. 3d at 923. As opposed to its TTAB appeal where it presented a 
commissioned survey that the TTAB did not find persuasive, before the district court Booking.com 
presented Teflon survey evidencethe recognized standard for determining whether a mark is gener-
ic. Id. at 898; MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 12:16. The Teflon Survey is a survey format broadly ac-
cepted by courts to measure a mark’s secondary meaning to consumers. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, 
§ 12:16. The Teflon Survey was first used in 1975 in E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int’l 
Inc., where the court held that a survey asking respondents to classify a series of terms as brand names 
or common names, after receiving an explanation of the difference, was valid evidence that consumers 
believed “Teflon” to be a brand name. 393 F. Supp. 502, 526–27 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). In that case, the 
court relied on a survey to determine consumers’ perception of a trademark. Id. at 527. A Teflon sur-
vey is a survey format that involves asking whether the respondent thinks a series of terms are com-
mon names or brand names. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, at § 12:16. Since 1975, companies have fre-
quently used the Teflon survey format to demonstrate that their trademark has acquired secondary 
meaning to consumers such that consumers use the mark to distinguish their goods from competitors. 
See, e.g., Elliot v. Google Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1166–67, 1176 (D. Ariz. 2014) (relying on a 
Teflon survey to find that that “Google” had not become generic for search engines); Hershey Co. v. 
Promotion in Motion, Inc., No. 07-1601, 2011 WL 5508481, at *9 (D.N.J. Nov. 7, 2011) (finding that 
Hershey’s numerous Teflon surveys offered reasonable evidence that “KISSES” are recognized by 
consumers as a distinct brand); March Madness Athletic Ass’n, L.L.C. v. Netfire, Inc., 310 
F. Supp. 2d 786, 803 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (using Teflon survey evidence showing that consumers identi-
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district court agreed that “booking” was generic, but found that “Booking.com,” 
when considered as a whole, was descriptive and that the public used it not to 
identify a type of website or service, but rather a specific website.68 In addition, 
the court found that the name had developed significance to consumers who as-
sociated it with a specific brand that offered a superior product.69 The PTO ap-
pealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
in 2019, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court.70 The Fourth Circuit 
agreed with the district court that Booking.com had acquired secondary meaning 
and found it noteworthy that the PTO had no evidence showing “booking.com” 
was a generic term that customers used to indicate a class of services.71 Subse-
quently, the PTO petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review 
the Fourth Circuit’s decision, which the Court granted.72 
                                                                                                                           
fied “March Madness” as a trademark and not generic to find that the mark had obtained secondary 
meaning). Although courts tend to rely on Teflon surveys to indicate secondary meaning, the PTO 
disfavors the format as a test of a mark’s genericness due to the potentially ambiguous and subjective 
nature of its questions. See, e.g., Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc., v. Princeton Vanguard, LLC., 124 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1184, 2017 WL 3948367 at *15 (T.T.A.B. 2017) (rejecting a Teflon survey that did not 
adequately explain the difference between a trademark and a generic term and used an ambiguous 
example that may have confused participants); Zimmerman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1425, 2004 WL 763936 at *12–13 (T.T.A.B. 2004) (outlining failures of a Teflon survey that was 
improperly structured by having only 96 participants, giving respondents misleading examples, and 
lacking a “don’t know” answer option). 
 68 Booking.com B.V., 278 F. Supp. 3d at 914, 922 (making its decision on the basis of new evi-
dence such as the Teflon survey and the social media following for Booking.com). In Goodyear, the 
Supreme Court held that that adding “Company,” a word that indicates a business association, to 
“Goodyear Rubber,” a term that describes a means of production, did not make the mark eligible for 
trademark status because both terms were generic and when combined did not distinguish the product. 
Goodyear’s Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U.S. 598, 602–03 (1888). In considering 
“Booking.com” as a trademark, the district court held that the “company” designation in Goodyear 
was solely an indicator of corporate status, and that it was substantially different from “.com,” which 
is a domain component and holds meaning to consumers as indicating a unique address. Booking.com 
B.V., 278 F. Supp. 3d at 910. Compare Goodyear, 128 U.S. at 602–03 (noting that “Company” indi-
cates a business type and holding that no entity could trademark the term combined with a generic 
word because the combination imparts no distinguishing meaning to consumers), with Booking.com 
B.V., 278 F. Supp. 3d at 910 (differentiating an entity designation with a domain name and stating that 
the latter specifically indicates a unique web address and thus is distinguishing to consumers). 
 69 Booking.com B.V., 278 F. Supp. 3d at 918–19. 
 70 Booking.com B.V. v. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., 915 F.3d 171, 181 (4th Cir. 2019), vacated, 
140 S. Ct. 2298 (2020). The Fourth Circuit reiterated trademark policy to safeguard brand goodwill 
and prevent customer confusion, and it affirmed that companies would never be able to trademark 
generic marks such as “Lite Beer,” which may provide the company a monopoly over all light beer 
marketing. Id. at 176–77. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit clarified that the PTO has the burden of prov-
ing that a mark is generic because the consequences of such a decision have serious implications for 
trademark registration. Id. at 179. 
 71 Id. at 181–82. Instead of demonstrating that customers use “booking.com” generically to indi-
cate a class of booking services, the PTO simply referenced similar domain names, like “hotelbook-
ing.com” and “ebooking.com” to support its argument that Booking.com had not acquired secondary 
meaning. Id. at 182. 
 72 U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2304 (2020). 
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II. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN U.S. PATENT AND  
TRADEMARK OFFICE V. BOOKING.COM B.V. 
In the Supreme Court’s 2020 case, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office v. 
Booking.com B.V., the Justices considered whether granting trademark protec-
tion to a mark styled “generic.com” would limit competition and whether a 
blanket prohibition against the mark would be reasonable.73 On June 30, 2020 
the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision in favor of Book-
ing.com due to the company’s acquired significance to consumers.74 Section A 
of this Part examines Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion.75 Section B focuses 
on Justice Breyer’s dissent.76 
A. Justice Ginsburg’s 8–1 Majority Opinion 
The Court ruled in favor of Booking.com due to the website’s acquired 
meaning to customers.77 Justice Ginsburg, in her majority opinion, held that 
although “booking” and “.com” may alone be generic, together they were de-
scriptive.78 Additionally, although a generic term can never be trademarked, a 
descriptive term can be if evidence shows it has acquired secondary meaning.79 
                                                                                                                           
 73 Oral Argument, supra note 63, at 9:03 (responding to a question from Justice Thomas about 
whether allowing the trademark would give Booking.com an unfair advantage over other online book-
ing providers and thus a per se rule would be appropriate); id. at 37:04 (suggesting the PTO was at-
tempting to create a per se rule, contrary to its prior decisions). 
 74 U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2307 (2020). 
 75 See infra notes 77–85 and accompanying text. 
 76 See infra notes 86–95 and accompanying text. 
 77 Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2305. Justice Ginsburg rooted her analysis in the primary sig-
nificance test, a test that the PTO uses to determine whether a mark has lost its distinctive meaning to 
consumers by becoming generic and thus should lose its registration. Id. at 2304; see 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1064(3) (stating that the PTO would cancel a previously registered mark if it became used generical-
ly for the goods or services for which it was initially trademarked). The majority used the primary 
significance test to highlight the importance of consumer perception and declined to hold whether the 
test was applicable outside of mark cancellation. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2304 n.3. 
 78 Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2306 (holding that a “generic.com” mark may be descriptive if 
it communicates details to a consumer about the mark’s source, that is, the website’s owner). The PTO 
has interpreted Goodyear as creating a rule that a mark styled “Generic Company” could not be 
trademarked at all, regardless of secondary meaning. Id. The majority corrected this understanding 
and stated that Goodyear’s holding meant that multiple generic terms would remain generic if their 
combination imparted nothing to differentiate the brand to consumers. Id. In its analysis, the majority 
first considered the mark as a whole. Id. at 2304. For example, people do not refer to “booking.coms” 
as types of booking suppliers; rather the term indicates a particular provider of that service. See id. at 
2304−05 (declaring that “Booking.com” was not generic and had a distinguished meaning to consum-
ers). Next, the majority considered whether “Booking.com” had developed consumer meaning. Id. at 
2304. After noting that lower courts had made uncontested determinations that it had, the Supreme 
Court held that the brand could be trademarked. Id. at 2305. 
 79 Id. at 2303. The majority stated that the PTO can accept evidence of secondary meaning from 
surveys, dictionaries, common usage, or anything that demonstrates that customers see the mark as 
distinguishing the business from its competitors. Id. at 2307 n.6. Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opin-
ion highlighted that although survey evidence may be faulty, the Supreme Court had not mandated 
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Acquired secondary meaning indicates that consumers recognize that the mark 
indicates a specific brand.80 The Court highlighted that a single business can 
hold a domain which already gives it a particular meaning to consumers.81 Be-
cause Booking.com presented survey evidence demonstrating that it had ac-
quired secondary meaning to consumers, its mark was eligible for trademark 
status as a descriptive mark.82 The Court refused to adopt the PTO’s proposed 
per se rule, which would declare any “generic.com” mark to be generic and 
ineligible for trademark protection regardless of consumer perception.83 Fur-
ther, the majority rejected the PTO’s concerns of monopolization.84 The Court 
held that these risks accompanied any descriptive mark and were mitigated by 
the fact that, for a descriptive mark, infringement occurs only when use of a 
similar mark confuses customers.85 
                                                                                                                           
any evidentiary requirement and instead indicated that the PTO should rely on a myriad of data, in-
cluding consumer use and perception and even dictionary evidence. Id. at 2309 (Sotomayor, J., con-
curring). 
 80 Id. at 2303 (majority opinion). 
 81 See id. at 2306 (clarifying that because a domain name represents a unique website that only 
one entity can occupy, a consumer will understand the domain name to indicate a specific website or 
the website’s owner). 
 82 See id. at 2305 (holding that “Booking.com” was a mark that had developed special meaning to 
customers and thus was not generic). Trademark eligibility depends on consumer perception of the 
mark as distinguishing the brand from competitors. Id. at 2307. 
 83 Id. at 2305. A “per se” rule is one that applies without considering the facts or context of the 
particular case. Per Se, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1. In this case, a per se rule would 
mean that the any mark styled “generic.com” would not be able to receive federal trademark registra-
tion regardless of whether or not its owner could prove that consumers recognized the mark as belong-
ing to a particular good or service. See Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2305–06 (finding that the 
PTO’s premise for its per se rule was faulty because “generic.com” is not comparable to “Generic 
Company” in that “.com” signifies a unique website, rather than being a general indication of corpo-
rate status). 
 84 Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2307; see Brief for the Petitioners at 44, Booking.com B.V., 
140 S. Ct. 2298 (No. 19-46), 2020 WL 114444, at *44 (arguing that neither precedent nor the Lanham 
Act allowed for granting Booking.com exclusive control of a generic term). 
 85 Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2307; see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (detailing that a mark-
owner may take civil action for misuse of his mark when the misuse is likely to cause consumer con-
fusion). Additionally, the Court pointed to other safeguards against mark monopoly, such as the fair use 
defense, which would prevent Booking.com from edging out competitors. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 
at 2307−08. For example, Booking.com would only be able to bring suit against “internetbook-
ing.com” if it could demonstrate that the use of its mark was not in good faith or fair, meaning that the 
competitor was intentionally trying to mislead Booking.com consumers and there was a likelihood of 
confusion. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (recognizing that the fair use doctrine would apply, preventing 
Booking.com from getting a monopoly over their mark, and suggesting the doctrine as an available 
defense for the infringing user of a registered trademark); Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2307 (stat-
ing that anti-competition concerns accompany every descriptive mark). Additionally, the Court found 
that consumer confusion is less likely to occur when the mark incorporates descriptive elements be-
cause consumers realize these are commonly used to describe a type of goods and services and do not 
distinguish brands from each other. See id. (explaining that consumers are less likely to think a com-
petitor’s use of a mark with a generic or descriptive term comes from the mark’s owner, and less like-
ly to be misled). 
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B. Justice Breyer’s Dissent 
Justice Breyer was the sole dissenting vote.86 Essentially, he viewed 
“Booking.com” as generic, not descriptive, and thus ineligible for a trademark 
regardless of consumer perception.87 He also posited that even if the mark 
were descriptive and registration were a question of consumer perception, it 
would be extremely difficult to establish because surveys offer inadequate evi-
dence.88 He brushed off the suggestion that Booking.com could present any-
thing that would demonstrate consumer perception.89 Modern people know 
that a domain name leads to a particular website, and any evidence may just be 
reflecting that understanding, rather than recognition of the particular brand.90 
Justice Breyer noted that, even if a generic mark were to gain significance 
to consumers, allowing registration would be against Lanham Act policy.91 A 
generic term describes a class of goods and services, like “haircut” or “grocery 
store,” and permitting an entity to trademark such a term could lead to monop-
olization.92 An entity using the same generic term to describe its business 
would risk expensive litigation.93 Nevertheless, Justice Breyer offered reassur-
                                                                                                                           
 86 Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2309 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 87 Id. at 2310–11 (arguing that, because trademark law does not protect generic marks and the 
term “Booking.com” provided no additional information to the consumer, it was ineligible for federal 
trademark protection). 
 88 Id. at 2313. The Teflon survey found that about three quarters of participants recognized 
“Booking.com” and a third incorrectly thought “washingmachines.com” was a distinct brand. Id. at 
2313–14; Brief for the Respondent at 12, Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298 (No. 19-46), 2020 WL 
833244, at *12. Justice Breyer argued that because these two were equally generic, the survey in fact 
likely indicated the effectiveness of Booking.com’s advertising campaign, not that its generic brand 
name had acquired distinctiveness. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2314 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 89 Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2313. Justice Breyer stated that the majority was looking for 
common usage that would show the generic nature of the term, but that this was faulty because no one 
would refer to travel websites broadly as “booking.coms.” See id. (stating that the survey evidence the 
majority relied on simply asked whether consumers link the term with one source, a process that pre-
supposes that “generic.com” marks are descriptive because people understand that a “.com” leads to a 
particular website).  
 90 Id. at 2312. 
 91 Id. at 2310 (citing CES Publ’g Corp. v. St. Regis Publ’ns, Inc., 531 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1975)) 
(describing the long-standing anti-monopoly policy for disallowing generic trademarks, regardless of 
consumer perception). The Lanham Act supports competition, as it is intended to protect the consumer 
from fraudulent or faulty products and the company from encroachment upon its cultivated goodwill. Id. 
at 2310 (citing Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189 (1985)) (presenting the Su-
preme Court’s recognition of the purpose and importance of the Lanham Act); see H.R. REP. NO. 79-
219, at 2 (1945) (noting the legislative purposes of the Lanham Act, including to support competi-
tion). 
 92 See Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (giving “wine” as an example 
of a generic term).  
 93 Id. at 2315. For example, in theory, if Booking.com had received its trademark, it could sue 
“ebooking.com” or “Booker.com” for trademark infringement. Id. The threat of this action may 
squash competitors, giving Booking.com a monopoly over other booking services. See id. (describing 
the implications of Booking.com receiving trademark registration). 
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ances to those with ineligible marks.94 According to the Justice, trademark sta-
tus is unnecessary for “Booking.com” to protect itself, in addition to being ex-
pressly against the policies and practice of the Lanham Act.95 
III. STRINGENT EVIDENTIARY REQUIREMENTS SHOULD BE ENACTED TO 
TEST SECONDARY MEANING AND PREVENT BUSINESSES  
FROM MONOPOLIZING GENERIC TERMS 
In 2020, in U.S. Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V., the Su-
preme Court affirmed the primacy of consumer perception and goodwill in fed-
eral trademark law.96 In Booking.com, the Supreme Court recognized that a 
brand’s goodwill may grant a mark its protection, even when the mark is de-
scriptive.97 Since the Supreme Court’s 1888 case, Goodyear’s Rubber Mfg. Co. 
v. Goodyear Rubber Co., the Court has been increasingly friendly to companies 
wanting to claim ownership over their brand’s goodwill.98 Booking.com will lead 
                                                                                                                           
 94 Id. (discussing other protections available to businesses with marks that are ineligible for 
trademark protection). Justice Breyer stated that Booking.com was already given exclusive use of its 
brand by virtue of owning the domain name, and that, in lieu of trademark registration, the company 
could rely on unfair competition laws and false advertising laws. Id. He also questioned the motiva-
tion for a business that sought to trademark a generic term, arguing that, given other protections, it 
would only be beneficial to businesses seeking to squelch competition. Id. 
 95 Id. at 2315−16. Nevertheless, in its brief and in oral arguments, Booking.com repeatedly offered 
assurances that it sought trademark protection not to defeat competitors but, rather, to protect its goodwill 
from Internet scams and cybersquatting. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 88, at 25–26 (dis-
cussing the vulnerability of websites to fraud from scammers posing as their website in order to dupe 
unsuspecting customers); Oral Argument, supra note 63, at 48:35 (arguing that Booking.com wants 
trademark status to protect against fraud, not to vanquish competitors). 
 96 U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. v. Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2307 (2020) (holding that the 
ultimate test for determining if a mark styled “generic.com” is deserving of trademark protection is 
whether the mark has secondary meaning—if consumers perceive the mark as distinguishing the 
brand from its competitors). 
 97 See id. (holding that Booking.com is eligible for trademark protection because of the estab-
lished consumer recognition of the brand as a travel booking provider); id. at 2308 (recognizing that 
because “Booking.com” is a descriptive mark and therefore weak, it would be difficult to show con-
sumer confusion in an infringement claim and difficult to prevent others from using the term). 
 98 Compare Goodyear’s Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U.S. 598, 603 (1888) 
(holding that simply adding “Company” to a generic term did not entitle the term to trademark protec-
tion), and Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. D. Trainer & Sons, 101 U.S. 51, 52–53, 55–56 (1879) (holding 
ineligible for trademark registration a specially-styled mark indicating producer and quality, despite 
customers identifying it with the brand), with Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 174 
(1995) (allowing a color to be trademarked because it had acquired a secondary significance to con-
sumers as indicative of the business’s product), and Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. v. S.S. 
Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 204, 207–08 (1942) (holding that a company deserved protection against an 
infringing competitor for its distinctive shoe style), and Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 
111, 122–23 (1938) (representing a more restrictive approach to trademark protection). In 1938, eight 
years before Congress passed the Lanham Act, the Supreme Court decided Kellogg Co. v. National Bis-
cuit Co. 305 U.S. at 123. In Kellogg, the Court dismissed National Biscuit’s infringement suit against 
Kellogg for using the shape of its cereal. Id. The Court held that National Biscuit had no right to the 
goodwill it had garnered in its shape because the shape was functional, not trademarked, and Kellogg had 
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to more trademark applications from brands with descriptive marks and those 
styled “generic.com.”99 But even if these brands receive federal trademark pro-
tection, there are measures in place to prevent them from monopolizing the 
field.100 Section A of this Part affirms that Booking.com was within the scope of 
the Lanham Act.101 Section B recommends that the PTO adopt a strict eviden-
tiary standard to determine the secondary meaning of descriptive marks.102 
A. Booking.com and the Lanham Act 
The decision in Booking.com was in line with the Lanham Act’s pur-
pose.103 The Lanham Act provides federal trademark status to businesses so 
that consumers feel confident that they are getting the product they want and 
so that businesses can ward against the fraudulent exploitation of their 
brand.104 Justice Breyer argued that the Booking.com decision would lead to an 
                                                                                                                           
attempted to differentiate its brand. Id. at 122. In Kellogg, the Court subordinated the business that 
possessed the goodwill in the interest of allowing product competition. See id. (stating that Kellogg 
was “sharing” in the goodwill and reputation that National Biscuit had cultivated by producing its 
invented cereal shape, but that this was not unfair when the shape of the cereal was not trademarked or 
patented). More recently, in 1992’s business-friendly judgment Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 
the Supreme Court held that a business did not have to show that its registered mark had secondary 
meaning to sue for infringement when the mark was distinctive. 505 U.S. 763, 776 (1995). The PTO 
has read Goodyear’s restriction on trademarks expansively, resulting in a regime which dramatically 
limits companies’ ability to trademark generic terms. See Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 84, at 17 
(arguing that “.com” was parallel with “Company” as a generic company designation which, in line 
with Goodyear, does not sufficiently differentiate a mark). Booking.com limits Goodyear and allows 
for the trademarking of a combination of generic terms if that combination results in a descriptive sec-
ondary meaning. See supra notes 78–83 and accompanying text (describing the majority’s rationale for 
redefining Goodyear). 
 99 See A. John P. Mancini et al., Insight: Trademark Rights Still Intact After High Court Book-
ing.com Decision, BLOOMBERG L. (July 22, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/insight-
trademark-rights-still-intact-after-high-court-booking-com-decision-7 [https://perma.cc/M988-CK6N] 
(discussing the implications of Booking.com and providing “generic.com” examples of real trademark 
applications filed immediately following the decision). 
 100 See infra notes 109–115 and accompanying text (including the PTO trademarking process and 
the evidentiary requirement to demonstrate that the mark has gained secondary meaning). 
 101 See infra notes 103–108 and accompanying text. 
 102 See infra notes 109–121 and accompanying text. 
 103 See infra notes 104–108 and accompanying text (describing the implications and rationale of 
the Booking.com decision as in line with the policy of the Lanham Act). 
 104 See Lee, supra note 32, at 1626–27 (listing benefits of federal trademark status); supra notes 
22–29 and accompanying text (stating the policy of the Lanham Act and federal trademark registration 
status as protecting company goodwill and consumer expectations). There are three reasons why a 
business may want federal trademark registration: (1) it is prima facie evidence that may be used in 
court indicating that the mark is legitimate and owned by the business; (2) it provides protection 
across the United States; and (3) it gives notice to others that the business owns the mark and any use 
of it is trademark infringement. Lee, supra note 32, at 1626–27. These reasons benefit the business by 
validating its ownership of the mark and, in turn, protect the consumer by safeguarding against in-
fringing marks that may cause consumer confusion. See id. (describing why a business would choose 
federal trademark registration over state registration or no registration). 
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escalation of generic marks that would monopolize their fields and push out 
competitors.105 But the outcome in Booking.com meets the Lanham Act’s pur-
pose because it recognizes, on the basis of evidence, that consumers distinguish 
the mark “Booking.com” as differentiating the business from its competitors.106 
Allowing a mark to receive federal protection on the basis of consumer percep-
tion acknowledges that that perception is grounded in the goodwill of the busi-
ness and in its efforts to cultivate the brand.107 Booking.com upholds the purpos-
es of trademark law, to ensure that consumers receive the product they want and 
are not duped by products taking advantage of another’s mark.108 
B. Rigorous Evidentiary Standard for Descriptive Marks 
The Booking.com ruling does not mean automatic registration for descrip-
tive marks.109 Truly generic marksthose that describe a category of goods 
and serviceswill still not be entitled to trademark registration.110 To gain 
trademark registration for a descriptive mark, companies will still have to pre-
sent the PTO with evidence that their mark has acquired secondary meaning to 
consumers, such that consumers distinguish their brand from competitors from 
the mark alone.111 Although a majority of the Supreme Court found Book-
ing.com’s survey compelling, its holding did not clarify what evidence will be 
sufficient for other marks.112 The PTO must establish and administer a strin-
gent evidentiary standard for secondary meaning.113 If the PTO will accept 
                                                                                                                           
 105 U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. v. Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2315–16 (2020) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 106 Id. at 2305 (majority opinion).  
 107 See H.R. REP. NO. 79-219, at 2 (1945) (discussing the policy for protecting brands through 
trademarks). See generally Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 204 
(1942) (holding that a company deserves protection if it has successfully developed its brand). 
 108 See Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2305 (stating that the Lanham Act protects a descriptive 
mark if it has secondary meaning and if consumers use that mark to distinguish the product from 
competitors, and that “Booking.com” meets that criteria); H.R. REP. NO. 79-219, at 2 (describing the 
purpose of the Lanham Act, to bestow federal trademark status to protect a company’s cultivated 
goodwill and a consumer’s expectation). 
 109 See Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2307 n. 6 (discussing that, for a company to trademark a 
“generic.com” term, it must still present evidence to demonstrate meaningful consumer perception, as 
well as go through the PTO trademarking process). 
 110 Id. at 2303 (holding that marks generic to their associated goods or services will never be 
eligible for trademark registration because they are inherently unable to distinguish their producers). 
 111 See id. at 2302 (stating that the PTO may grant federal trademark status to a descriptive mark 
if it has a demonstrated secondary meaning and consumers use the mark to distinguish the brand from 
competitors). 
 112 See Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2307 & n.6 (holding that “Booking.com” was eligible for 
trademark status because it was not generic and that this analysis depends on consumer perception). 
 113 See id. (holding that evidence of customer perception may be anything that shows how con-
sumers distinguish the brand). Traditionally, the PTO has disfavored the Teflon survey as ambiguous 
due to the subjective nature of its questions. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 12:16 (describing flaws 
with Teflon surveys, including one instance in which the examples used in the survey were unclear 
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survey evidence, the survey must meet requirements for diversity of respond-
ents, as well as incorporate questions that are non-leading and allow for con-
sumers to express uncertainty.114 The PTO must also consider evidence of any-
thing that indicates how consumers understand a brand, like dictionaries, 
common usage, and survey data.115 
Importantly, if a brand were to successfully demonstrate secondary mean-
ing and register its descriptive mark styled “generic.com” with the PTO, it 
would be difficult for the brand to block competitors and attempt to monopo-
lize use.116 A competitor’s use will only infringe upon a descriptive mark when 
that use is likely to confuse consumers.117 In essence, courts in infringement 
suits consider descriptive marks weaker, so the standard for establishing 
trademark infringement is higher.118 Additionally, a competitor may refute an 
infringement complaint through the affirmative fair use defense.119 These safe-
guards mean that a trademark-owner is unlikely to waste expenses litigating 
against a competitor who is fairly using the owner’s mark.120 Ultimately, the 
purpose of trademarking a descriptive mark may be less to discourage compe-
                                                                                                                           
and the respondents had a limited array of choices). A strict standard for consumer perception, includ-
ing guidance on conducting surveys, would yield more transparent evidence of secondary meaning. 
See Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2309 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (reinforcing the majority hold-
ing and emphasizing that the PTO can deem what evidence is appropriate to demonstrate what the 
brand signifies to consumers). 
 114 See MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 12:16 (explaining the Teflon survey format, how it has be-
come the standard for courts, and identifying some PTO criticism of the survey style, including that it 
does not allow for uncertainty). 
 115 Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2309 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 116 See infra notes 117–121 and accompanying text (explaining why it would be difficult for a 
“generic.com” mark-owner to monopolize use of its mark). 
 117 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (detailing the circumstances of trademark infringement). Section 1125 of 
the Lanham Act also details when a mark-owner may pursue civil action for trademark infringement, 
namely in cases where the misuse is likely to confuse customers or when the use “misrepresents” the 
brand. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). In KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., a trade-
mark infringement case in 2004, the Supreme Court held that the burden was on the party bringing the 
action to establish likelihood of confusion. 543 U.S. 111, 124 (2004). 
 118 See Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2307 (explaining that weaker marks are less likely to be 
able to succeed in a trademark infringement suit). 
 119 See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text (describing the fair use defense: that if the 
competitor argues that their use was fair and in good faith, the burden shifts to the mark-owner to 
show consumer confusion). It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court has stated that some consumer 
confusion is acceptable for a descriptive mark because otherwise the mark-owner would receive a 
monopoly over a descriptive term that competitors use to describe a good or service generally. KP 
Permanent, 543 U.S. at 122. 
 120 See Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2307–08 (outlining a safeguard against a mark owner 
gaining a monopoly over a descriptive mark, including that the mark owner must demonstrate con-
sumer confusion as a result of the infringing use and refute the fair use defense). A trademark-owner 
faces a high bar in making this argument, considering that some consumer confusion is acceptable for 
a descriptive mark. Id. 
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tition and more to access certain avenues for relief against counterfeit products 
or scams.121 
CONCLUSION 
In 2020, in U.S. Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V., the 
Supreme Court acknowledged that a combination of generic terms can yield a 
descriptive mark that is deserving of trademark status. Paramount in this hold-
ing is the Supreme Court’s recognition that the consumer’s perception of the 
brand’s mark is the ultimate test of trademark eligibility. To prevent the prolif-
eration of “generic.com” marks, the PTO must enact a strict evidentiary stand-
ard for testing consumer perception. With that standard, the risk of a company 
monopolizing a generic term is low because safeguards, like the evidentiary 
requirement, the PTO registration process, and the fair use defense, in addition 
to the inherent difficulties of suing on behalf of a weak descriptive mark, make 
the possibilities of a successful infringement suit unlikely. 
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 121 See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 88, at 25–26 (detailing that Booking.com wanted the 
protection against scams and fraud, not competitors). 
